The joint evaluation of emergency assistance to Rwanda: study III principal findings and recommendations
The French-led Opération Turquoise that pushed into western Rwanda on 22 June, and then concentrated on the creation of a so-called Safe Zone in the south-west, remained in the country for two months. The operation protected approximately 14,000 threatened civilians within Rwanda and the improvement in security in the south-west enabled a dramatic increase in humanitarian assistance activities by the three agencies that operated during the April–June period to at least 15 agencies by August. Such efforts served to spread out over a longer time period the number of
displaced Rwandese crossing into Bukavu and to limit their eventual number. Had this not been done, it is highly likely that the mortality rates experienced in Bukavu would have been much higher.
Despite this, judgements of the benefits of Opération Turquoise have to be qualified. By concentrating forces in the Safe Zone after the end of June, the operation:
- greatly increased the likelihood of an RPF advance in the north-west and thus of a massive refugee influx into Goma;
- did not provide the security necessary for humanitarian agencies to operate freely in the northwest and respond to the needs of the large and growing number of IDPs there;
- diverted attention of donor organisations, UN agencies and NGOs to the south-west at a critical juncture for those in the north-west.
The positive contribution of Opération Turquoise in reducing and spreading out the movement of IDPs into Bukavu has to be balanced by the fact that the several hundred thousand Hutu who were encouraged to remain in IDP camps in the Gikongoro area presented the new government and the UN with an extremely difficult problem. Though the majority were eventually returned to their home communes, several thousand IDPs were killed at Kibeho camp in April 1995. The south-west has arguably remained the most insecure area of the country.
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3625
displaced Rwandese crossing into Bukavu and to limit their eventual number. Had this not been done, it is highly likely that the mortality rates experienced in Bukavu would have been much higher.
Despite this, judgements of the benefits of Opération Turquoise have to be qualified. By concentrating forces in the Safe Zone after the end of June, the operation:
- greatly increased the likelihood of an RPF advance in the north-west and thus of a massive refugee influx into Goma;
- did not provide the security necessary for humanitarian agencies to operate freely in the northwest and respond to the needs of the large and growing number of IDPs there;
- diverted attention of donor organisations, UN agencies and NGOs to the south-west at a critical juncture for those in the north-west.
The positive contribution of Opération Turquoise in reducing and spreading out the movement of IDPs into Bukavu has to be balanced by the fact that the several hundred thousand Hutu who were encouraged to remain in IDP camps in the Gikongoro area presented the new government and the UN with an extremely difficult problem. Though the majority were eventually returned to their home communes, several thousand IDPs were killed at Kibeho camp in April 1995. The south-west has arguably remained the most insecure area of the country.
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3625
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